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Reynolds: Water Law - The Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction in Reserved Wate

Water Law-The Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction in Reserved Water
Rights Litigation. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied sub. nom. Oregon v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3536
(1984).
In 1975, the United States filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon for a declaration of water rights within the area
once comprising the Klamath Indian Reservation.' Several months later,
the State of Oregon began administrative proceedings to determine water
rights within the Klamath Basin, including that area involved in the
federal suit.2 The state then intervened in the federal action
as a defenintervened as a plaintiff.3

dant, and the Klamath Tribe

Citing the Colorado River abstention doctrine,' the state moved for5
dismissal on the ground that the federal court was not the proper forum.
The district court, in effect, denied the motion to dismiss through its pretrial order. 6 In that order, the court limited the issues to the scope and
priority of water rights arising from the treaty between the United7 States
and the Tribe and from later transfers of the reservation land.
After a trial on the merits and the court's entry of judgment,8 the
defendants appealed, contending in part that the court should have
dismissed the suitY The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that when a district court has proceeded to determine the
nature and priority of water rights that are governed by federal law in
a case involving Indian litigants, its decision should not be reversed. Such
a reversal would waste judicial resources and thus violate the purpose
of the Colorado River abstention doctrine. 0
BACKGROUND

The controversy in Adair centered on the proper forum for adjudicating reserved water rights." Before a federal court should consider
abstaining in a reserved rights case, it must conclude that both it and
1. United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1979), affd as modified, 723 F.2d
1394 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub. nom., Oregon v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3536 (1984).
2. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1399.
3. Id.
4. See Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976).
5. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1399.
6. Id at 1402 n.6. The court never expressly ruled on the motion to dismiss. Id
7. See id In limiting the issues before it to the scope and priority of the reserved water
rights, the court left quantification and administration to the state.

8. As part of its judgment, the court retained jurisdiction. Adair,478 F. Supp. at 350.
9. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1400.
10. Id at 1404. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in all respects
except for its refusal to determine the federal government's water priorities separately. Id
at 1420.
11. Although raising other issues on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Oregon appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court only on the forum issue. See 52 U.S.L.W. 3900 (U.S. June 6, 1984).
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the relevant state courts have personal and subject matter jurisdiction. 2
Federal district courts have jurisdiction to try cases involving reserved
water rights by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal-question statute.'3
Reserved water rights, commonly called Winters rights,' 4 are a creation
of the federal judiciary and therefore are governed by federal law.'" The
federal courts also have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 because the
United States is generally a plaintiff in these cases. Finally, 28 U.S.C. §
1362 confers federal jurisdiction for reserved rights cases involving Indian tribes.
State courts of general jurisdiction also have subject matter jurisdiction over reserved rights claims, but they do not have personal jurisdiction over the United States or Indian tribes unless the United States and
the tribes have waived their sovereign immunity. 6 The United States has
waived its immunity from state general water adjudications through the
McCarran Amendment." The McCarran Amendment does not expressly
waive the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes, but it does so as a practical matter since the United States, as trustee for the Indians, can bind
them through its participation in a state water suit."
Because of concurrent jurisdiction, litigants have three alternative
routes for determining reserved water rights. They may seek a general
adjudication in state court,'9 a general adjudication in federal court," or
a federal court determination of reserved rights which is then grafted onto
a state adjudication.2 Indian tribes prefer a federal forum because they
12. See R. CASAD,

JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS § 1.01 (1983).
13. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. at 809 n.15.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) reads: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
14. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
15. See generally Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew: FederalReservation of Rights to the Use of Water, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 639.
16. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 3201, 3212-14 (1983).
17. United States v. District Court in and for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 524
(1971). 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982) provides in part:
Consent is hereby given to join the United States as a defendant in any
suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or
other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that
the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights
by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and
the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States, when
a party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead
that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable
thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments,
orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review
thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances: Provided,That no judgment for costs shall be entered
against the United States in any such suit.
18. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. at 3213 n.17.
19. See Comment, Determinationof Federal Water Rights Pursuantto the McCarran
Amendment: General Adjudication in Wyoming, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 457 (1977).
20. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1398-99.

To

21. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT
THE PRESIDENT AND To THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 483 (1973).
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fear that state courts are prejudiced against their claims." The states,
on the other hand, have generally sought state adjudication of all water
claims, including reserved rights claims. 3 This dispute over the forum has
been called "half of the battle" in reserved rights litigation.2 '
The United States Supreme Court squarely confronted the issue of
the proper forum for reserved rights suits in Colorado River Water ConservationDistrictv. United States.25 In ColoradoRiver, the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado, relying on traditional abstention doctrines, 6 dismissed a water suit brought by the United States in
its own behalf and as trustee for an Indian tribe.27 The Tenth Circuit reversed the dismissal and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court held that the district court had correctly abstained even though none of the traditional grounds for abstention, which
are all based on comity, applied. The Court created a new abstention doctrine aimed at saving judicial resources. 8
ColoradoRiver abstention is based on a balancing test. In deciding
whether to dismiss, a district court must weigh practical considerations
in favor of dismissal, especially the avoidance of duplicative litigation,
against its heavy obligation to exercise jurisdiction. 29 "Only the clearest
of justifications will warrant dismissal.""0
Using this balancing test, the Supreme Court decided that dismissal
was appropriate in Colorado River.3 The most important factor in favor
of dismissal was the legislative policy of the McCarran Amendment, namely, the avoidance of piecemeal adjudication in a river system which can
result in needless duplication.12 The Court also listed several secondary
3
factors associated with the policy as further support for dismissal.1
22.
AND

REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, RESERVED WATER RIGHTS FOR FEDERAL
INDIAN RESERVATIONS: A GROWING CONTROVERSY IN NEED OF RESOLUTION 127

(CED-78-176) (Nov. 16, 1978).
23. See Eliot and Balcomb, Deference to State Courts in the Adjudication of Reserved
Water Rights, 53 DENVER L.J. 643 (1976).
24. Indian Water Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on AdministrativePractice
and Procedureof the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1976) (statement of
Reid Chambers, Associate Solicitor, Dep't of the Interior).
25. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
26. See id at 813-16.
27. Id. at 805-06.
28. Id. at 817. Although Colorado River itself did not call its rule an abstention doctrine, lower courts and commentators have. See Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960,965 (2d Cir. 1980).
29. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818.
30. Id at 819.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 820. The secondary factors were:
(a) the apparent absence of any proceedings in the District Court, other than
the filing of the complaint, prior to the motion to dismiss, (b) the extensive
involvement of state water rights occasioned by this suit naming 1,000 defendants, (c)
the 300-mile distance between the District Court in Denver and the
court in Division 7, and (d) the existing participation by the Government in
Division 4, 5, and 6 proceedings.
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In Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe,3 4 a case which it called a sequel to Colorado River,35 the Supreme Court increased the weight to be
given the McCarran Amendment in the balancing test for reserved rights
cases.16 The Court held that the McCarran Amendment itself provided
the "clearest of justifications" for dismissal because the McCarran Amendment had been enacted to encourage state adjudication of all water
rights." No federal district court should exercise its concurrent jurisdiction, the Court stated, if it would thereby create "the possibility of
duplicative litigation, tension and controversy between the federal and
state forums, hurried and pressured decisionmaking, and confusion over
the disposition of property rights." '
The San Carlos Court listed three exceptional situations in which a
federal court may exercise its jurisdiction: when a state court expressly
agrees to stay its consideration of the issues in the federal action, when
the arguments for and against dismissal are closely matched and the suit
is brought by Indians to adjudicate their rights only, or when the motion
to dismiss is filed after the federal action is so far along that dismissal
would itself create duplication and waste. 9
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

In the wake of Arizona v. San CarlosApache Tribe, the Ninth Circuit
decided United States v. Adair."IThe court admitted that the factors found
controlling in Colorado River and San Carlos "necessarily determined"
its analysis and that dismissal was proper in the majority of reserved
rights cases. 4 1 It decided, however, that in Adair the district court did
not clearly abuse its discretion when it concluded "that exceptional circumstances requiring dismissal were not presented.""
The Ninth Circuit determined in Adair that all three San Carlos exceptions allowing for the exercise of federal jurisdiction applied. The court
rejected the state's argument that the exercise of jurisdiction.would
be
43
contrary to the policy of the McCarran Amendment.
First, the state adjudication remained at an investigative stage at the
time of the appeal, seven years after it had begun. From this, the court
34. 103 S. Ct. 3201 (1983).
35. Id. at 3204.

36. See id. at 3214-15. Dismissals should be the norm rather than the exception because
"water rights adjudication is a virtually unique type of proceeding, and the McCarran Amendment is a virtually unique federal statute, and we cannot in this context be guided by general
propositions." Id. at 3216.
37. Id. at 3214-15.
38. Id. at 3215.
39. Id

40. San Carlos came after the parties in Adair had argued before the Ninth Circuit.
The court therefore had the parties submit supplemental briefs to argue how San Carlos
should affect the outcome of Adair.Supplemental Brief for the State of Oregon at 1, United
States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983).
41. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1983).
42. Id. at 1403.
43. See id. at 1404.
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had been stayed
of appeals concluded that the state adjudication, in effect,
4
to await the outcome of the federal adjudication.
Second, the district court had limited its exercise of jurisdiction to
determine only those issues governed by the federal law of reserved water
rights. 4 5 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that by so doing, the district court
had not only avoided possible duplication, but had also narrowed the case
to fit the limits of the second San Carlos exception. The Ninth Circuit
stated that "in light of the district court's limited exercise of jurisdiction,
the case presented, for all practical purposes,46 a suit to adjudicate Indian
water rights on behalf of an Indian Tribe.Third, the federal action had been instituted months before the state
began its proceeding. By the time of the ruling on the motion to dismiss,
none of the preliminary steps necessary for state adjudication had been
completed. 7 The Ninth Circuit implied from these facts that a dismissal
would have created duplication and waste. Further, the district court had
reached a final judgment by the time of the appeal. The Ninth Circuit
decided that a reversal would have created the 4very duplication the McCarran Amendment had been enacted to avoid.
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

At first glance, it appears that the Ninth Circuit correctly applied the
San Carlos exceptions to the facts of Adair in order to justify the district
court's exercise of jurisdiction. In reality, however, the facts of Adair do
not fit the exceptions set forth in San Carlos.None of the facts in Adair
actually warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
This does not mean that the Ninth Circuit had no good reason for its
decision. The Ninth Circuit was faced with a dilemma which the appellate
courts did not face in either ColoradoRiver or San Carlos. In those cases,
the district courts had dismissed the reserved rights suits before trial.
The appellate courts did not have to nullify extensive adjudications which
had been completed. In Adair, on the other hand, the case reached the
Ninth Circuit after the district court had completed its adjudication. If
the Ninth Circuit reversed, then the district court's work of several years
would have been wasted. It is therefore not surprising that the court made
every effort to fit the Adair case into one of the San Carlos exceptions
so that the district court's adjudication could stand.
The "Express Agreement to Stay" Exception
Under San Carlos, a federal district court may exercise its jurisdiction when a state court expressly agrees to stay its consideration of the
same issues that will arise in the federal adjudication.4 9 Through its stay,
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id at 1405.
Id at 1406.
Id. at 1407.
Id at 1404-05.
Id. at 1405.
See supra text accompanying note 39.
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the state becomes a willing partner in a coordinated effort to adjudicate
all the water rights on the river system involved. Therefore, the federal
court does not interfere with the state's prerogative under the McCarran
Amendment to adjudicate all the rights in a watershed.
The Ninth Circuit, in Adair, applied this "stay" exception without
regard to its purpose. The court pointed to the state's slow progress in
its adjudication and concluded that the state had effectively stayed its
proceedings. But the San Carlos exception requires that the state expressly
agree to stay its adjudication in order to ensure that the state has actually given its consent to the federal adjudication. In Adair, the State of
Oregon did not expressly agree to stay its proceedings. In fact, there was
no stay at all. The state's adjudication had slowly progressed only because
it was difficult for the state to " 'move forward' when.., a federal court
[was] engaged in the process of declaring rights which will necessarily affect all other water rights on the river.' 0 The State of Oregon's forced
"stay" did not fall under the San Carlos "stay" exception because it was
created by tension between the forums rather than by cooperation.
The "Adjudication of Indian Rights" Exception
In Arizona v. San CarlosApache Tribe, the Supreme Court stated that
a district court can exercise its jurisdiction when the arguments for and
against dismissal are closely matched and the suit is brought by Indians
to adjudicate only their reserved rights.5 1
The Ninth Circuit opined that the arguments for and against dismissal
were closely matched in Adair because the district court had limited the
case to only those issues governed by the federal law of reserved water
rights. By limiting its determinations to federal issues, the federal court
handled issues that matched its expertise, and its findings on those issues
could be later integrated in the state adjudication. It avoided state issues
which the state courts were better able to decide. 5 No possibility of
duplicative litigation existed, and a strong argument in favor of dismissal
disappeared.
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly concluded that the arguments for and
against dismissal became closely matched when the district court limited
the case to federal issues. As part of its judgment, the district court retained jurisdiction in order to supervise the distribution of water consistent with its opinion." By retaining jurisdiction, the district court made
duplicative litigation and tension between the forums a near certainty."
50. Reply Brief for Appellant, State of Oregon at 9, United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d
1394 (9th Cir. 1983).
51. See supra text accompanying note 39.
52. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1403 n.7.
53. United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336, 350 (D.Or. 1979).
54. See Supplemental Brief for the State of Oregon at 8, United States v. Adair, 723
F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983).
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Under San Carlos, the arguments for and against dismissal are never closely matched when there is even a possibility of duplication and tension.2
Without closely matched arguments, the "adjudication of Indian rights"
exception did not apply in Adair.
Even if the arguments for and against dismissal were closely balanced,
United States v. Adair was not a suit brought by Indians to adjudicate
their rights alone. The district court determined reserved water rights for
the Tribe, individual Indians, the United States government, and nonIndian successors to Indian lands.5 The adjudication was not within the
limits of the "adjudication of Indian rights" exception. Therefore, the
general rule of abstention should have applied.
The "Delay in the Motion to Dismiss" Exception
The third San Carlos exception to the general rule of abstention applies when a state or private party moves to dismiss the federal adjudication, in favor of a state adjudication, 7 after the federal suit is so far along
that dismissal would itself create duplication and waste." Clearly, it would
be a waste of the court's and the litigants' efforts to have a federal case
near completion dismissed in favor of an incipient state adjudication.
The Ninth Circuit declared that several circumstances brought Adair
under this exception. First, the state proceedings started after the federal
adjudication was underway. Second, the federal adjudication had progressed farther than had the state adjudication at the time the district
court ruled on the motion to dismiss. Finally, the federal adjudication had
the state adjudication at the time the Ninth
progressed farther than had
9
Circuit heard the appeal.
None of these three facts, however, actually supports the court's use
of the "delay in the motion" exception. When a district court decides
whether to dismiss under the ColoradoRiver abstention doctrine, the order
in which the actions begin is irrelevant. 0 In ColoradoRiver, as in Adair,
the federal action was filed before the state adjudication began. 6' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held in Colorado River that dismissal of the
federal adjudication was proper. The Ninth Circuit should have reached
the same conclusion in Adair.
55. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 3201, 3215 (1983). "Although adjudication of those rights in federal court ... might in the abstract be practical, and even
wise, it will be neither practical nor wise as long as it creates the possibility of duplicative
litigation."
56. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1407-08.
57. Normally, a state would delay in making a motion to dismiss because a state general
adjudication had not yet begun. The McCarran Amendment only allows a district court to
dismiss an adjudication out of deference to a concurrent state proceeding. See supra note 17.
58. See supra text accompanying note 39.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
60. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 927, 939 (1983).
61. Id. at 940.
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In Adair, the Ninth Circuit improperly compared the progress of the
state proceedings with the progress of the federal adjudication as of the
time of the federal district court's ruling on the motion to dismiss. Under
Colorado River, the time of the filing of the motion, not the time of the
ruling on the motion, is controlling.12 Usually a court rules on a motion
to dismiss soon after it is filed, so the court need not distinguish between
the two times. But in Adair, nearly two years elapsed between the filing
of the motion to dismiss and the ruling on that motion. 63 At the time of
the filing, both proceedings were in their infancy,6'4 and therefore, the
federal action should have been dismissed.6 5 At the time of the district
court's ruling on the motion, however, the parties and the district court
had invested additional effort. The Ninth Circuit concluded that this additional effort precluded dismissal.6 If the Ninth Circuit had followed San
Carlos and compared the progress of the state and federal adjudications
as of the time the motion to dismiss was filed in the district court, then
the court could not have used the "delay in the motion" exception to
justify its affirmance.
The critical fact which the Ninth Circuit used to affirm the district
court's judgment under the "delay in the motion" exception was that the
federal adjudication was complete at the time of appeal. Because of this
fact, the court determined that the McCarran Amendment's policy of
avoiding duplication and6 7waste would not be served by a reversal of the
lower court's judgment.
The Supreme Court stated in San Carlos that a federal district court
can deny a litigant's motion to dismiss if the federal adjudication is
substantially complete at the time of the motion. 61The purpose of the exception is to allow a district court to proceed confidently with an adjudication if the parties have not filed a motion to dismiss. The district judge
is assured that the adjudication will not be nullified if a motion to dismiss
is filed later in the proceeding and he denies the motion.
The exception never applies when a motion to dismiss is filed early
in an adjudication as it was in Adair. In such a case a district court has
not expended substantial time or effort which would be wasted if it
dismissed. Unless one of the other San Carlos exceptions to the Colorado
62. The Ninth Circuit itself admitted that the time of the motion was determinative:
We realize, of course, that where both the state and the federal proceedings
are in their infancy at the time of a motion to dismiss the federal proceeding,
both ColoradoRiver and San Carlos Apache Tribe indicate that absent unusual
circumstances, the federal court should defer to the state proceeding.
Adair, 723 F.2d at 1405 n.8.
63. Supplemental Brief for the State of Oregon at 6, United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d
1394 (9th Cir. 1983).
64. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1402-03.
65. See supra note 62.
66. It is hard to see how the Ninth Circuit could come to this conclusion since at the
time of the ruling on the motion to dismiss, the district court had not even limited the issues
for trial. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1402 n.6.
67. See supra text accompanying note 48.
68. See supra text accompanying note 39.
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River abstention doctrine applies, the district court will clearly abuse its
discretion if it adjudicates.
The district judge's abuse of discretion occurs at the time he rules
on the motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals should review that ruling based on the posture of the case as of that time. If the district judge
denies the motion to dismiss and the adjudication is completed at the time
of appea4 this fact does not aid an appellate court in deciding whether
the district court has abused its discretion. The Ninth Circuit should not
have based its decision in Adair on the fact that the district court had
completed its adjudication by the time of appeal.
The Adair Dilemma
One can understand why the Ninth Circuit decided Adair the way it
did. If the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, the parties
would have been right back where they were eight years before. This result
of the Colorado River doctrine
would have been repugnant to the
9 spirit
and the McCarran Amendment.
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit's decision to affirm the district court
in Adair based on the adjudication's completion at the time of appeal
undermines the Supreme Court's decisions in Colorado River and San
Carlos. The Adair decision may encourage district courts to adjudicate
reserved rights cases even though they should obviously abstain under
the Colorado River abstention doctrine. The district courts may expect
their improper decisions to be affirmed because the adjudications will be
complete at the time of appeal. Adair opens the door to abuses of discretion by district judges who may wish to hear reserved rights cases.
Not only did United States v. Adair undermine the ColoradoRiver
doctrine, it also violated the Supreme Court's guidelines in San Carlos.
The San Carlos exceptions did not really apply to the facts of Adair, but
the Ninth Circuit's decision stands because the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Lawyers handling cases like Adair in the future will risk a similar
result if they do not find a way to obtain early appellate review.
Possible Solutions to the Adair Dilemma
The dilemma in Adair arose because the attorneys for the State of
Oregon appealed the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss after
the adjudication was complete. 0 If they had appealed the denial of the
motion immediately, the dilemma would not have arisen. The court of appeals could have reversed and sent the case to state court without nullifying a completed adjudication. The court could have thus avoided a questionable application of the San Carlos exceptions.
69. The Ninth Circuit called such an option "throwling] the baby out with the bath."
Adair, 723 F.2d at 1404.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
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A denial of a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory, rather than a final,
decision.7 ' Appeals from interlocutory decisions are governed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292. Certain interlocutory decisions are appealable as of right under
subsection 1292(a), but a denial of a motion to dismiss is not one of them.
The only way to appeal a denial of a motion to dismiss before a trial court
reaches its final decision is through subsection 1292(b). This subsection
grants jurisdiction to an appellate court when both the appellate court
and the district court approve. Before a district judge may certify an appeal from his interlocutory decision, he must "be of the opinion that such
an order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from
the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation. '"2
If a district court denies a motion to dismiss in a reserved water rights
case, that denial is tailor-made for certification for appeal. Such an order
involves the ColoradoRiver doctrine which is a controlling question of
law over which there is substantial ground for disagreement. An immediate appeal would also advance the termination of a reserved rights
adjudication. A court of appeals could answer the abstention question
before the district court had invested much time in the adjudication. If,
as in the majority of such cases, dismissal is required, then the court of
appeals is spared the dilemma presented by Adair.
Although 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is an attractive solution to the problem
presented by Adair, it is a solution dependent upon the cooperation of
the district judge. If the judge does not approve an immediate appeal from
his decision denying the motion to dismiss, then the appellate court must
await a final judgment before it can entertain an appeal on the interlocutory decision.
If a district judge refuses to certify his interlocutory decision for immediate appeal, the state's attorneys may petition a court of appeals for
an extraordinary writ of mandamus or prohibition. 3 The United States
Supreme Court has established two conditions which must exist before
a writ may issue. "[T]his Court has required that a party seeking issuance
have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires... and that
he satisfy the 'burden of showing that (his) right to issuance of the writ
74
is 'clear and indisputable'."
In a reserved rights case like United States v. Adair, a state clearly
has no means of obtaining adequate appellate review other than through
an extraordinary writ. An appeal after final judgment is inadequate. The
court of appeals in Adair, for example, was constrained to affirm the
71. See R.CASAD,

JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS

§ 6.01[5][c] (1983).

72. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b} (1982).
73. "Once power is found to issue a writ, little concern is shown to define the possible
technical and historic difference between mandamus and prohibition." C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER,
E. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3932, at 206-07 (1977).
74. Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol20/iss2/7

10

Reynolds: Water Law - The Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction in Reserved Wate
1985

CASE NOTES

district court's decision because a reversal at that late date would have
created duplication in conflict with the ColoradoRiver doctrine's primary
purpose.
A petitioner in a writ proceeding must not only show that he has no
other adequate means of obtaining relief. He must also show that he has
a clear and indisputable right to the writ's issuance. Courts of appeal have
often interpreted this standard to mean that a district judge must clearly abuse his discretion before a writ will issue.75 This is the same standard as that applied by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Adair, which
was an appeal from a final judgment. Therefore, a petitioner for a writ
of prohibition has no greater burden than the appellants had in Adair.
It is likely that lawyers who seek a writ of prohibition in a reserved rights
case will be able to obtain it.
CONCLUSION

In Adair, the Ninth Circuit purported to follow the Colorado River
and San Carlos holdings, yet none of the San Carlos exceptions actually
supported the Ninth Circuit's decision. The court's main reason for
upholding the district court's decision-that the case had been tried and
a reversal would create duplication-was not to be found in either of the
Supreme Court opinions.
The Ninth Circuit was faced with a dilemma for which its precedents
had not prepared it. The court could have followed the strict requirements
of San Carlos and reversed. Reversal would have caused further delay and
duplication in an already protracted litigation. On the other hand, the court
could have affirmed the district court's decision in spite of the district
court's abuse of discretion. The Ninth Circuit chose this second alternative
and affirmed, but in so doing it created a precedent for unfettered district
court discretion in reserved rights cases.
Water lawyers representing states or private parties can avoid the
Adair dilemma only by moving for interlocutory review when district
courts deny motions to dismiss. They can obtain interlocutory review
through discretionary appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or through petitions for extraordinary writs. If, before trial, appellate courts review
district court decisions to hear reserved rights cases, then the federal
forums will only be available when and if the states desire federal participation, and Adair will be treated as an anomaly.
MATTHEW REYNOLDS

75. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655,677 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In Calvert, a majority of the justices indicated willingness to issue a writ of mandamus based
on a district judge's misapplication of the ColoradoRiver abstention doctrine. See id at 667-68
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
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